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ABSTRACT
This paper examines rate structures of privately owned electric uti-
lity firms. The results show that industrial customers are favored relative
to commercial and industrial users. Commercial and industrial users, however,
are treated equally. No evidence of internal cross subsidation was found in
the data.

AN EXAMINATION OF PRICE DISCRIMINATION
AND
INTERNAL SUBSIDATION BY ELECTRIC UTILITIES
By Walter J. Primeaux, Jr. and Randy A. Nelson
INTRODUCTION
The social benefits generated by employing marginal cost pricing
principles in the design of public utility rate schedules have long been
recognized by economists. While economic theory dictates that consumers
bear the incremental costs of serving them, many economists have argued
that institutional and political forces, operating through regulatory
agencies, have caused deviations from this norm.
In recent years several different theories have emerged to explain
why various groups may receive preferential treatment at the hands of
regulatory bodies. These theories may be divided into two broad cate-
gories: (1) "benefit" theory of regulation, and (2) the wealth redistri-
bution theory.
The benefit theory maintains that various special interest groups
seek to initiate regulation or to control the regulatory process; once
the regulatory process has been set in motion, special interest groups
"capture" the benefits that regulation generates. The regulated firms
themselves may lobby for regulation to obtain a government-enforced mono-
2
poly or cartel market structure; politicians may employ the rate struc-
3
ture of publicly owned utilities to increase political support; and
various customer groups may possess sufficient economic or political
power to wrest favorable rates from regulatory commissions. These latter
two variants of the "benefit" theory often lead to different conclusions
as to which customer group will be the favored class.
The wealth redistribution theory, advanced recently by Posner, states

that "regulation unavoidably involves issues of wealth redistribution
4
between customer classes ..." and
"The basic mechanism is the internal subsidy. A firm provides
a service below its real cost, and the deficit is made up by
(usually) other customers of the firm who pay higher prices
than they would otherwise. "5
Redistribution through utility rates has been viewed as unfavorable
by some authorities.
Up to this time, little empirical evidence has been developed to
test for the existance of price discrimination or internal cross-subsi-
dization by privately-owned electric utilities. The main purpose of this
study is to examine three questions. First, do these firms practice
price discrimination as they sell their output to consumers. Second,
which, if any, customer class is most successful in "capturing" the bene-
fits of regulation. Finally, do electric utilities engage in internal
cross-subsidization in an effort to redistribute wealth between customer
classes? The results show that price discrimination does exist in the
rate structure of private electric utilities, and that this discrimina-
tion favors industrial customers relative to commercial and residential
users; the latter two groups are treated equally. The favorable rates
accorded the industrial users were not, however, found to increase as
the "power" of this customer group increased. Finally, no evidence of
internal cross-subsidization was discovered.
PREVIOUS STUDIES
Previous investigations into electric utility rate structures have
largely concentrated upon the effectiveness of regulation in holding down
the prices charged to various customer classes. The first such study,
that of Stigler and Friedland, tested whether "regulatory bodies would
o
reduce domestic rates relative to industrial rates ..." to reduce

3discrimination arising from the more elastic demand of industrial users
or for political reasons. They tested this hypothesis by examining the
average ratio of charges per KWH to industrial and residential customers.
Their results were contrary to those expected; the average ratios of
charges per KWH between industrial and residential users were not statis-
tically different.
Succeeding studies have adopted the opposite point of view, hypo-
thesizing that regulators would favor the larger, or industrial user,
9
over the smaller, or residential customer. Jackson employed multiple
regression analysis to explain the variation in average revenue received
from residential and commercial-industrial users in the years 1940, 1950
and 1960. The regulation binary variable for the commercial-industrial
customer class was significant and negative in all three test periods,
while it was significant in only one period for residential customers.
Mikesell provides additional support for Jackson's conclusions
by applying a test similar to that used by Stigler-Friedland. Mikesell
employed regression analysis to determine the factors affecting the ratio
of the average monthly residential charge for 750 KWH to 250 KWH. Included
in the aquation was a regulatory dummy variable, the value depending upon
a state's use of fair value or original cost in determining the rate base
of the utility. Mikesell' s results indicate that "tighter" regulation,
indicated by the use of original cost rate base valuation, results in a
lower per unit charge to larger residential customers.
Hollas, in a study of municipal electric utility firms, found that
price discrimination was practiced by firms in that segment of the industry.
This study found that discrimination was practiced by the firms under
state regulation, while firms free of state regulation did not discriminate.
The preceeding studies, while providing valuable insights into the

4pricing practices of electric utilities, do not provide a test for price
discrimination by privately owned electric utilities, either because of
their methodology or because of their sample.
Stigler and Friedland did not include cost considerations in their
investigation of price differentials; yet, as Stigler explained later
"Price differences do not necessarily indicate discrimination . . . con-
12
versely price equality does not demonstrate the absence of discrimination."
Stigler explained that marginal costs must be considered to assess price
discrimination.
Jackson and Mikesell in their separate studies, relied upon average
cost, rather than marginal cost, to explain rate differences. Moreover,
an assessment of price discrimination between market segments was not an
important part of either study.
The Hollas study examined price discrimination in some detail; however,
it focused attention upon municipal utilities which comprise a relatively
13
small segment of the electric utility industry. Consequently, price
discrimination in the larger, privately owned segment of the industry has
been neglected.
PROCEDURE
In this paper we present an alternative method with which to test
for the existence and direction of regulatory bias in electric utility
rates.
The marginal cost of service and the average revenue for each of
the three customer classes are computed. Any divergence in the price-
marginal cost ratios for the three groups would signify the existence
of price discrimination, and thus indicate the existence of a favored
14
customer class (es)/ The use of the price-marginal cost ratio allows

5us to test not only for the direction of regulatory bias, but also for the
possibility of internal subsidization between customer classes.
The procedure involved the development of short run and long run
cost functions for the firms in the sample. The statistical procedure
used was ordinary least squares regression analysis and the particular
equations specified are discussed below.
The sample includes 80 privately-owned electric utilities operating
in the United States. Firms not facing state regulation possibly operate
differently from firms in regulated environments; so these firms were
excluded to avoid bias. Firms using nuclear generation were also excluded
because nuclear fuel estimates may not have been accurate. Additional
firms were dropped from the sample as necessary due to the lack of reliable
fuel cost estimates or peak load demand data, which were used in develop-
ing the cost estimates.
All data, unless otherwise noted, were taken from the FPC's Statis-
tics of Privately Owned Electric Utilities - 1973 . Peak load data was
taken from the 1970 and 1975/76 editions of McGraw-Hill's Electrical
World. The fuel cost data were taken from the National Coal Association's
Steam-Electric Plant Factors .
The test for price discrimination requires the estimation of the long
run marginal cost curve for each firm in the sample. Rather than esti-
mating this curve directly, the short run marginal cost curve was estimated
first, then the marginal cost of meeting peak demand was added. The
estimation of the long run marginal cost curve was carried out in three
steps. The first step entailed the calculation of the marginal generating
costs. An estimate was then developed for costs of distribution and
transmission, resulting from the loss of power in the transmission process.
The final step consisted of computing the marginal capacity cost incurred

6in constructing the additional capacity needed to meet peak load demands.
Generation Costs
In theory one would like to know the marginal cost of producing the
last unit in the "marginal" plant. Since many firms typically employ a
variety of sources to meet output requirements at various demand levels,
this "marginal" plant would change from season to season and hour to hour,
depending upon demand fluctuations. Because of the uncertainty regarding
the identity of the source of the marginal unit, an alternative procedure
was followed and a weighted average was taken of all the sources of power
to the firm.
The marginal cost of producing in a steam generation plant was esti-
mated with the following euqation:
2
1) TC = S + S
n Q + S„Cap + S.P. + S.Q Cap + S C Q + e
s o Is 2 3 f 4s 5 s s
where:
TC = total annual steam production expenses, less rent.
Q = number of kilowatt-hours generated in steam plants.
Cap = total kilowatt generating capacity of all steam plants-
P = weighted average fuel price.
e = random error term.
s
The marginal cost of producing in a hydro-electric generating facility
was estimated with the following equation:
2) TCh
= H
Q
+ H
lQh + H2
Q2 + %
where:
TC = total annual hydro production expense, less rent.
Q. = number of kilowatt-hours generated in hydro plants,
e^ = random error term.

7The marginal cost of generation in an "other" facility (internal
combustion and gas turbine) was estimated by the following equation:
3) TC = 8 + 6,Q + e„Q + 6 Cap + e.P^ + 6.Q Cap + e
o o 1 o 2 o 3 o 4 fo 5 o o o
where
:
TC = total annual "other" production expenses, less rent.
Q = number of kilowatt-hours generated in "other" plants,
o
Cap = total kilowatt-hour generating capacity of "other" plants.
P £ = total "other" fuel costs/Q .fo o
e = random error term,
o
Many of the firms included in the sample, instead of generating all
of the power sold, purchased substantial portions of their power require-
ments from other firms. These purchases must also be considered in the
analysis.
The FPC reports only the net purchased power expense (including ex-
changes) for each firm; consequently, this practice prohibits the use of
a simple average cost of purchased power, obtained by dividing the purchase
power expense by the number of kilowatts of purchased power. The diffi-
culty arises because some firms were net sellers of purchased power and
thus reported a negative purchased power expense.
To avoid problems which would have occurred by using published data,
the average price of purchased power and interchanged power were used.
These data were provided by the FPC. It should be noted that in using
an average price as an estimate for the marginal cost of purchased and
interchanged power it is implicitly assumed that the price paid for these
inputs does not vary with the quantity purchased.
Distribution and Transmission Costs
An electric utility, in addition to generating electricity, must

8transmit and distribute its output among its customers. One important
component of transmission and distribution costs is the electricity
17
lost in the transmission and distribution process. Following Moore,
this loss may be estimated in the following manner:
4) LL = L + L.Q + L„Q + L.QT + L, Q + L CM + eTo l^r 2 xc 3HI 4a 5 L
where:
LL = line loss in kilowatt hours.
Q = sales to residential customers in kilowatt hours,
r
Q = sales to commercial customers in kilowatt hours,
c
QT = sales to industrial customers in kilowatt hours •
Q = sales to other customers in kilowatt hours .
a
M = structure miles.
e^ = random error term
.
The term L., i = 1,2,3,4, represent the number of kilowatt-hours
that must be generated or purchased in order to supply the i customer
class with one additional kilowatt-hour of power.
REGRESSION RESULTS
The foregoing discussion provides the procedure used and the speci-
fication of the equations which are necessary to compute the marginal
costs of electricity for firms in the sample. This section presents the
empirical results.
Equations 1 through 4 presented in Table 1 provide the information
necessary to compute the short-run marginal variable cost of providing
the i customer class with an additional kilowatt hour of electricity.
5) MC. = Q
_1
(Q MC + O.MC, + Q MC + Q MC )xL.
3 x
x
s s Ti h xo o P P J
where
:
MC. = the short run marginal variable cost of supplying the j
customer class.
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10
Q = the total number of kilowatt-hours generated in steam,
hydro, and other facilities, plus the number of kilowatt -
hours purchased.
Q. = (i = s,h,o,p) the number of kilowatt-hours generated
in steam, hydro, or other facilities, or the number of
kilowatt-hours purchased
MC = (i = s,h,o,p) the marginal cost of generation in a
steam, hydro, or other facility, or the marginal cost
of purchased power.
L. = the number of kilowatt-hours that must be generated
to supply the j customer class with one additional
kilowatt-hour of output..
Marginal Capacity Costs
The previous procedure estimated the short-run marginal cost, however,
the marginal plant charge, or the incremental cost incurred in constructing
the capacity to generate an additional kilowatt-hour, remains to be esti-
mated. Following De Salvia, "a first approximation of the marginal plant
charge may be obtained from an examination of the fixed costs of operating
. „. . t „18existing equipment.
Fixed costs are defined as the sum of depreciation, amortization,
taxes, rent, interest payments, and net income. The first four items
were included as the costs incurred in the utilization of the existing
capacity, the last two as the costs necessary to obtain this capacity.
In addition to the income earned from electric divisions, firms in-
eluded in the sample earned income from gas and other utility operations.
Since the Federal Power Commission publications do not apportion interest
payments and net income among operating divisions, the following procedure
was employed to assign these charges. The interest payment allocated to

11
the electric division is proportional to the share of the electric plant
to total utility plant; the net income charged is proportional to the share
of electric utility operating income to total utility operating income.
In estimating the marginal plant charge, it is assumed that the firm
must construct additional capacity to meet the demand arising in the peak
periods. The marginal plant charge is thus the change in fixed cost
arising from an additional KWH of peak demand, multiplied by the change
in peak demand, given a change in total KWHs demanded (i.e., marginal
d fixed cost d KWH
plant charge =
d KWH
x ^^eak
peak d KWHr total
Since the marginal plant charge is used as an estimate of the cost
of obtaining an additional KWH of generating capacity in the future, three
possible sources of bias emerge. Inflation may increase the cost of adding
additional capacity, while improving technology may reduce it. These two
errors may or may not be offsetting. The procedure used requires the assump-
tion that a firm will increase its generating capacity by acquiring steam,
hydro, and other generating facilities in the same proportion that it
currently employs them.
The results of the equations used to estimate the marginal plant charge
are presented in Table II.
Allocation of Capacity Costs
The decision of how to allocate the marginal plant charge is one that
has perplexed economists, as is evidenced by the over-thirty allocation
19
schemes that have been proposed. Ideally, one should employ marginal-
cost pricing in which each customer class bears a marginal plant charge
in proportion to its contribution to peak demand. Shepherd has found,
however, that "the majority of American electric utilities, private and
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20
public, do little or no explicit marginal-cost pricing at all."
The allocation method employed in this paper consists of multiplying
the marginal plant charge by the total system peak demand, and allotting
this charge to the various customer classes in proportion to their contribu-
tion the total KWH demand. This method is equivalent to marginal-cost
pricing if each group contributes to total demand in the same proportion
as it contributes to peak demand.
The marginal plant charge to each customer class is thus:
,, „„i %KWH. x KWH x MC
6 ) MCD i P Pp KWH.
x
where
:
MC = marginal plant charge of the i customer class.
%KWH. = the percentage of the i customer class KWH
demand to total KWH demand.
KWH = the number of KWH demanded in the peak period,
P
MC = marginal plant charge
.
KWH, = KWH demand of the i customer class.
l
PRICE DISCRIMINATION
The final step prior to calculating the price-marginal cost ratio
for each customer class is the derivation of the price estimate to be
employed in this ratio. Electric utilities employ block pricing and a
constant charge is made for a given block or fixed number of KWH. Ideally
one would like to obtain a price-marginal cost estimate for a specific
block of consumption. Unfortunately, since disaggregated data of this
type is unavailable, it is impossible to identify a given purchase as
being from a specific block. For this reason, average revenue (total
revenue divided by the total KWH purchased by a given class) is used as
the estimate of price.

14
The test for price discrimination consists of an F test; the main-
tained hypothesis . is that the price-marginal ratio is the same
for each customer class. The results of this test are presented in Table IIx.
The results of the test in Table III clearly indicate the existence
of price discrimination by privately owned electric utilities. The average
price-marginal cost ratios for residential, commercial, and industrial
customers are 4.46, 4.52, and 2.41 respectively. The F statistic of
5.23 with (2,237) degrees of freedom is significant at the 1% confidence
level, indicating that the average price-marginal cost ratios differ
significantly across the three customer classes. To further investigate
the source of the deviation in the price-marginal cost ratios across the
three customer classes the results of three pair-wise comparisons are
also presented in Table III. Three conclusions are apparent:
1) the price-marginal cost ratios of residential and commercial
customers are virtually identical as evidenced by the pair-
wise F statistic (1,158) of .0047.
2) the price-marginal cost ratio of the industrial customers
is significantly lower than that of the other customer
classes. The difference between the industrial and the
residential and commercial customers is significant at
the 1% confidence level.
3) The price-marginal cost ratios for each of the three cus-
tomer classes is greater than one. This implies that
each customer class pays at least the full long-run
marginal cost of serving that group. We thus conclude
that the firms in this sample do not practice internal
subsidization between different customer classes.
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These findings provide empirical support for the previous work by
Jackson, Mikesell, and DeAlessi, who argue that regulation favors indus-
trial over residential customers. Economic theory clearly expresses the
rationale and motivation for the relatively lower industrial prices.
Economic theory dictates that consumers with the highest price-elasti-
city of demand be charged the lowest price in order to maximize consumers'
21
surplus. The more elastic industrial demand is caused by the fact that
industrial customers ". . . if large enough, can generate their own power
23
as an alternative to the purchase of electric service." " It is not
surprising, therefore, that recent studies of the demand for electricity
by different customer classes indicate that industrial users have the
23highest price-elasticity of demand.
After a rate hearing, when higher earnings have been approved by the
commission, the regulated firm is instructed to construct the appropriate
rate schedules to generate the increased rates of return and to submit
24
them to the commission for approval. The utility firm, as well as the
commission, must consider the different price elasticities of the individual
consumer classes as new rate schedules are constructed and implemented.
Regulators may thus be acting to maximize consumers' surplus when they
favor the industrial user by allowing them the lowest price-marginal
cost ratio.
To test whether regulators are motivated by political pressures as
Stigler and Friedland, DeAllesi, Peltzman, et. al. argue, or whether their
actions are motivated by an attempt to maximize consumers' surplus, the
sample was subdivided according to two criteria:
1) the average KWH consumption of residential customers was
divided into the average KWH consumption of industrial
customers to obtain a relative ranking of the average size

18
of industrial customers to residential customers for each
firm.
2) Each state was ranked according to the percentage of
electricity sold to industrial customers in the period
1963-1970 (as obtained from the FPC Profiles). Each
firm was then ranked according to its state's eight year
average of industrial to total KWH sold.
The rankings thus obtained provide a measure of the "importance" of
the industrial customer class to each of the firms. Presumably, as the
"importance" of the industrial users increase, so should their influence
and their ability to obtain preferential treatment from regulators. If
political pressure is brought to bear on individual firms by industrial
users, the firms in the top half of the rankings provided by scheme (1)
should have lower price-marginal cost ratios than those in the bottom
half. If political pressure is brought to bear on the regulatory com-
mission itself, then the firms in the top half of the rankings provided
by scheme (2) should have price-marginal cost ratios lower than those in
the bottom half. Finally, if regulators are attempting to maximize con-
sumers' surplus, and jif the price-elasticity of demand by industrial
customers does not differ systematically across states, then we should
find no difference in the price-marginal cost ratios in these different
ranking schemes; in this case, political pressure is not evoking any
price adjustments above those necessary to discriminate on the basis of
price elasticity of demand.
To test these hypotheses an F test was made comparing the top half
of each sample against the bottom half to determine if any statistically
significant difference in the price-marginal cost ratio existed. A second
test was made comparing the top third of each sample against the bottom
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third in an effort to accentuate any possible difference in the two groups.
The results of these tests are presented in the Appendix.
The F-tests indicate that no statistically significant differences
exist between the industrial price-marginal cost ratios in any of these
rankings. If, as DeAlessi argues, "larger users—with greater wealth at
stake—have greater incentive to seek lower rates (including smaller
increases) by lobbying before the regulators and by exercising political
25
pressure", then the tests should have indicated lower price-marginal
cost ratios in firms or states where a majority of the electricity was
sold to industrial customers. These findings thus raise serious questions
regarding the hypothesis that regulators are motivated primarily by
political factors in determining rate structures.
CONCLUSIONS
The analysis has shown that price discrimination does exist in the
rate structure of private electric utility firms included in this sample.
The results also show that industrial consumers are favored relative to
commercial and industrial users; commercial and residential users, however,
are treated equally.
Test results fail to support the notion that regulators are motivated
by political factors in establishing rate structures. Moreover, the data
fail to support the hypothesis that internal cross subsidation exist for
firms included in this sample.
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